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Investment of firms is affected by not only fundamentals factors, but liquidity constraint, ownership 
or corporate structure. Information structure between manager and owner is a significant factor to 
decide the level of investment, and deviation of investment from optimal condition. The reputation 
model between manager and owner suggest that the separate of ownership and management may 
induce the deviation of investment, and indicate that governance structure is important to reduce it. 
In this paper we estimate the deviation of investment using investment function, and investigate the 
relation of the derivation and ownership structure or corporate finance using data of Japanese listed 
firms. In empirical test the following results is induced. (i) The concentration of ownership reduces 
the deviation of investment. (ii) The deviation becomes smaller when main shareholder is 
government or individual. (iii) On the contrary it becomes larger when main shareholder is bank or 
foreign institution.   
These results suggested that the asymmetry of information between owner and manager bring the 
instability of investment, and bank system is not well functioned to solve the principal-agent 
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 The behavior of investment is unstable and fluctuated, and sometimes it becomes higher and 
others lower. Recently the phenomenon of investment is mainly analyzed by fluctuation of 
fundamentals factors. Over the past few decades the investment theory had developed. Abel 
(1980) is one of the representative literatures to develop investment model suggested by 
Jorgenson (1963), and induced Tobin’s q model. This model shows that investment level is 
determined by Tobin’s q, that is the ratio of shadow price of capital on the replacement price. 
These models show that investment level is determined by Tobin's q, that is, investment is not 
affected by liquidity constraint, ownership or corporate structure. 
 However these studies have mainly focused on the relation of fundamentals factors in 
economy and investment. Generally these models conclude that investment is not affected by 
financial corporation which is tightly connected on ownership structure. However the ownership 
structure also may affect on it. Keynes (1938) suggested that even though the separation of 
occupation and management encourages investment, sometimes may induce high instability, 
because the investment may be daily evaluated by myopic dealer in stock exchange market, and 
not there is a possibility of deviation from genuine evaluation by entrepreneur. 
Recently ownership structure or institutional monitoring plays one of significant roles for 
determinant of investment because of the existence of asymmetric information or conflict 
between owner (as a principal) and manager (as an agent). Hoshi, Kashyap and Scharfstein 
(1991) analyze the relation of the corporate financial structure and investment in Japanese firms, 
and showed that investment by firms closely related to a bank is much less sensitive to their 
liquidity than firms raising their capital through more arms-length transactions. They concluded 
that Japanese banks serves primary source of external finance and are informed about the firms, 
and resolve asymmetric information.   
Hoshi, Kashyap and Scharfstein (1991) emphasized the positive effect on investment behavior 
of firms. Jensen (1986) discussed that the debt prevents moral hazard of managers because it 
reduce to net profit value, and eliminates inefficient investment by managers. On the other hand 
debt has a negative effect on investment. Myers (1977) suggested that huge debt discourages 
investment even though there is a desirable opportunity of investment. There are two contrary 
opinions for debt effect. 
 Recent literatures suggested that ownership or financial corporation is tightly related to 
behavior of investment. However previous survey is not interested in instability of investment. 
In this paper we estimate the deviation of optimal condition, and analyze the relation of 
instability and corporate governance using reputation model. 
  Scherfstein and Stein (1990) discussed the instability of investment under the separation of 
manager and investors. They suggested that investor is affected by investor’s reputation, and different decision from their own private information. Ottaviani and Sørensen (2006) developed 
its theory and clarify that it is impossible to achieve truthtelling equilibrium under locally 
informative condition. Its literatures shows that it is difficult to transfer the precise information from 
agent to principal. 
 The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 discuss the information structure and deviation of 
investment from optimal condition under the separation of ownership and management. Section 3 
analyzes the relation of ownership structure or financial corporation on deviation of investment 




Optimal level of investment is depend on state  X x∈  as an economic condition. However 
nobody can perfectly capture it ex ante. There are two players, owner (principal) and manager 
(agent). Manager is an expert of management, and only she can previously receives private 
signal    as information of state.  S s∈
The signal is stochastically determined by the state  x  and the talent  T t ∈  with conditional 
probability density function,  . The higher the talent   is, the closer the signal   
become the state 
) , | ( t x s f t s
x . State and talent are assumed to be statistically independent. State and 
talent are assumed to be statistically independent, with common non-degenerate prior beliefs 
 on state and   on ability. Both of manager and owner can not perfectly capture the 
talent  , and manager guess by state and signal. Owner can not observe signal, and should 
guess by manager’s behavior. 
) (x q ) (t p
t
Manager decides the level of investment   after observation of the signal . Manager decide 
the strategy of investment from the signal , 
i s
s ) | ( s i ϕ . 
Owner observe the state  x  after manager’s decision, and evaluate the talent   and the 
benefit 
t
π , depended on investment    under the state condition  i x , (that is  ) | ( x i π . Here we 
assume that optimal investment level   exists which satisfies the condition
* i 0 / = ∂i ) x | ( ∂ i π , 
and    for  all i. The owner evaluates the manager  0 / ) |
2 < ∂ ∂ i x i (
2π )) | ( x i , (t v π  under  the 
condition , manager’s talent   and state  t x . The function  ) (⋅ v  is monotonically increasing 
function. 
Therefore finally owner evaluate the manager,    ) | ( x m W
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The conditional probability distribution function of talent,  , is defined by Bayes’ 
rule,  , where  , and 
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T dt t p t x i f x i f ) ( ) , | ( ˆ ) | ( ˆ . Owner should conjecture the manager’s strategy,  ) | ( ˆ s i ϕ . 
Manager could not observe the state condition x  ex ante, and decide investment i  to 
maximize value function,  .  ) | s m ( V
∫ =
X x i V ) | (
) | ( s x q
dx s x q x i W ) | ( ) | (                      ( 2 )  
  is a conditional probability density function of   on  i x , and defined as   
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X dx x q x s f s f ) ( ) | ( ) (   .  
The optimal condition for manager is  0 / ) | ( = ∂ ∂ i x i V , and manager behaves as a faithful 
agent for owner when investment is coincident with signal ( s i = , that is truthtelling 
equilibrium). As examine the optimal condition, the equilibrium condition is the following. 
 
Proposition 1.    At least there are at least two equilibrium conditions, (1) opitimal investment 
( ) which maximizing profit 
* i i = ) | ( x i π , and truthtelling equilibrium( s i = ), (2) not optimal 
investment ( ) and not truthtelling equilibrium (
* i i ≠ s i ≠ ) . 
Proof.  See  Appendix  1. 
 
 Owner concerns whether truthtelling condition can be achieved or not. If the signal   
contains information about manager’s talent t, and manager have an incentive to decide 
investment   which is different from receiving signal. Generally it is impossible to satisfies 
the condition except the uninformative condition, 
s
i
) | ( ) ( ) , | ( t s g t K t x s f =
3.  
 
) | ( x s g Proposition 2. Locally under the informative condition,  ) ( ) , | ( t K t x s f ≠ , it is 
impossible to achieve the optimal investment  . 
* i
Proof. See Appendix 2. 
 
x The informative condition means that the signal is determined only by state  , and 
independent of manager’s talent  . It depends on information structure between manager and 
owner. If owner can monitor manager, she can capture the probability function of signal  , or 
manager’s talent  . Therefore we can conjecture that the derivation of investment from optimal 
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Truthtelling". In next section we examine the effect of ownership on derivation of optimal investment. 
 
 
3. Empirical Test 
 The derivation of investment from optimal condition may bring instability, and sometimes to 
induce inefficiency. In this section we empirically analyze the relation of ownership structure or 
financial institution on deviation of investment. In this paper to estimate a standard investment 
function, we employ the explanatory variables, Tobin’s average q and cash flow ratio. 
 
Data 
We use the data The Corporate Financial Databank, compiled by the Development Bank of Japan 
(1982-2000). It covers all of listed firms in the stock exchanges. We exclude financial institutions 
from dataset. 
The real value of tangible fixed capital is calculated as Hori, Saito and Ando (2006). The ratio of 
stock holding is also available in The Corporate Financial Databank, the ratio of top one share 
holding, the total shareholder ratio by classification of shareholder type, government, financial 
institution, security companies, corporate company, foreign companies and individual. 
 
Method 
 At first we estimate optimal investment level. Investment level is determined by Tobin’s q (See 
Abel (1980), Hayashi (1982)), and only it should be the only determinant of investment if liquidity 
constraints are unimportant. We use the Tobin’s average q, which is the ration of average market 
value of firms to the replacement cost of its assets. In addition cash flow also affects the determinant 
under liquidity constraint. 
  We consider the two cases, case 1 not considering liquidity constraint, case 2 considering liquidity 
constraint, and estimate the deviation of investment. 
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t j e , ˆ   is the deviation of the real value from optimal level about ratio of investment to fixed capital in 
firm j at year t (absolute value, non negative).  t is the ratio of investment to fixed capital in firm 
j at year t (real value).  t  is the theoretical ratio of investment to fixed capital in firm j at year t 
j r ,  
j r , ˆ(estimate value).   
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    is the average Tobin’s q.   denotes the nominal value of cash flow in year t and   is 
the nominal value of total assets at the end of the previous fiscal year. 
t j q , t j f , t j a ,
0 β  is constant term, and 
j μ   express a fixed effect specific to firm j, and    is year dummy.  t d
  The result of estimation is table 1. 
 
Table 1 Estimation Results of Investment Function during 1982-2000 
                          
 
Model 
1 2 ˆ β       ˆ β       2 R  
Number of 
Observation
F-Test     
Hausman 
Test 
   
Case 1  Fixed Effect  0.000481 ***    0.0438  37579  10.2 ***  1546.41 ***
   (8.06)               
                  
Case 2  Fixed Effect  0.000278  *** 0.0178 *** 0.0561  37552  9.94  *** 2639.85 ***
     (4.54)     (14.60)                     
                  
Notes:  
(1)   and   mean estimated coefficients on Tobin’s q and on cash flow respectively. The 
figures in parentheses are t statistics. 
1 2 ˆ β ˆ β
(2) The estimation results are based on unbalanced panel data, and the method is fixed effect model. 
(3) *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
 
 This result show that liquidity constraint affects on investment of firms in Japan. It is known the 
coefficient,  , is positive and significant of coefficient. Next we estimate  , the deviation of 
the real value from optimal level, and empirically tests the relation of ownership structure or 
2 ˆ β t j e , ˆfinancial institution. 
  
Hypothesis 
 We test the following hypothesis to investigate the effect of ownership structure or financial 
institution. We employ the following variables, the ratio of stockholding by the largest stockholder 
(the index of concentration of ownership), government, bank, security companies, corporate 
company, foreign companies and individual (the index of difference on occupation). We consider the 
ratio of debt to total asset to see the effect of bank loan or company debt. In addition we classifies 
the type of the largest stockholder, and investigate the difference of ownership structure or finance. 
  
Hypothesis 1: If ownership is highly concentrated, the deviation of investment is low. 
 
 Hypothesis 1 is suggested by Keynes (1938), that is, the higher the concentration of ownership is, 
the less is the effect from exchange stock market   
 
Hypothesis 2: If bank have a governance for firms, the deviation of investment is low. 
 
Hypothesis 2 is suggested by Hoshi, Kashyap and Scharfstein (1991). They suggest that bank can 
monitors firms and solve the asymmetric information between manager and owner, and promotes 
investment. It is conjectured that bank system can clear the asymmetric information and achieve 
optimal investment level of firms. 
 
Hypothesis 3: If firm is owned by specified individual, the deviation of investment is low.  
 
 If main shareholder is individual, he or she may be family owner or related person. In this case 
ownership and management may not be separated or shareholder may have a power to manager. 
Anyway there are little asymmetric information between manager and owner.   
 
  We investigate the deviation of investment, ownership, financial institution as the follow model. 
 
t j t j t j X c e , , , ˆ ε γ + + =                                  ( 4 )  
c
j
 is  constant  term,    are variables of firm j’s ownership or any other financial institution, and  t j X ,
t , ε   is error term at year t.  
Results 
We estimate the relation of ownership or financial institution for two index of deviation of 
investment. One is the case 1, that is, not including cash flow ratio in estimation. Other is the case 2, 
that is, including cash flow ration with considering liquidity constraint. The estimation of results is 
the table 2. 
 
Table 2. The Effect of the Largest Shareholders to Deviation of Investment During 1982-2000 
 
    Case 1  Case 2 
top1 -0.00232***  -0.00225*** 
 (-6.84) (-6.65) 
type_d01 0.00380***  0.00462*** 
 (10.07)  (11.15) 
type_d02 0.00644***  0.00638*** 
 (39.86)  (39.12) 
type_d03 0.00678***  0.00672*** 
 (49.77)  (48.23) 
type_d04 0.00721***  0.00714*** 
 (55.85)  (54.53) 
type_d05 0.00865***  0.00848*** 
 (10.29) (9.88) 
type_d06 0.00636***  0.00629*** 
 (44.69)  (44.23) 
debt_asset 0.00250*** 0.00269*** 
 (6.08) (6.14) 
Observation 34650 34624 
F-Test 2728.19*** 2727.57*** 
2 R   0.385 0.385 
Notes:  
(1) The estimation results are based on pooled OLS model, and robustness estimators. The figures in 
parentheses are t statistics. 
(2) *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
  
  The each variable means as follows.   
top 1 : the ratio of shareholding by the largest shareholders.   type_d01 : dummy variable and become one if the largest shareholder is government.   
type_d02 : dummy variable and become one if the largest shareholder is bank.   
type_d03 : dummy variable and become one if the largest shareholder is security companies. 
type_d04 : dummy variable and become one if the largest shareholder is corporation (non financial 
institution).  
type_d05 : dummy variable and become one if the largest shareholder is foreign institution.   
type_d06 : dummy variable and become one if the largest shareholder is individual. 
debt_asset : the ratio of debt to total asset. 
 
  The ratio of shareholding by largest shareholder is high, the deviation of investment become low. It 
is known that the coefficient of top 1 is negative and statistically significant. It means that the 
concentration of ownership reduce the deviation of investment, and support hypothesis 1. 
  The coefficients of dummy variable show the following results. The deviation of investment is the 
smallest when the largest shareholder is government (type_d01 = 1), because the coefficient is 
smallest in any other dummy variables. The next smallest is type_d06, that is the largest shareholder 
is individual. Bank (type_02 = 1) is the third, and the foreign (type_05) is the largest. 
  These estimation results means that the derivation of investment is relatively small when the largest 
shareholder is government or individual, and is large when the largest shareholder corporate or 
foreign institution. 
  The coefficient of the ratio of debt to total asset (debt_asset) is positive and statistically significant. 
It means that governance of debt is not effective to the deviation of investment. 
  Next we analyze the relation of ownership classified by type of shareholder. The results is Table 3.     
 
 
Table 3. The Effect of Shareholders to Deviation of Investment During 1982-2000 
 
        
    Case 1  Case 2 
government -0.00594*** -0.00510***
 (-6.92)  (-5.53) 
finance 0.00195*** 0.00188***
 (6.45)  (6.19) 
Stock companies -0.00602*** -0.00672***
 (-3.28)  (-3.71) 
foreign 0.00618*** 0.00613***
 (8.95)  (8.81) individual -0.00194*** -0.00200***
 (-7.63)  (-7.89) 
debt_asset 0.00223*** 0.00246***
 (5.72)  (5.91) 
constant 0.00630*** 0.00629***
   (38.55)  (38.40) 
Observation 37186 37160 
F-Test 68.00***  66.49*** 
2 R   0.0106 0.0857 
    
Notes:  
(1) The estimation results are based on pooled OLS model, and robustness estimators. The figures in 
parentheses are t statistics. 
(2) In this regression we do not employ the variables, the ratio of shareholding by the largest 
shareholder (top 1) and the ratio of shareholding by corporation (corporation), because these 
variables is highly correlated. The coefficient of correlation is -0.61 between top 1 and bank, 0.76 
between top 1 and corporation, -0.62 between bank (the ratio of shareholding by bank) and 
corporation. To avoid multicollinearity, the variables, top 1 and corporation, is excluded. 
(3) *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
 
The each variable means as follows.   
government : the ratio of shareholding by governments.   
bank : the ratio of shareholding by banks.   
stock companies : the ratio of shareholding by security companies.   
foreigner : the ratio of shareholding by foreign institutions. 
individual : the ratio of shareholding by individuals.   
debt_asset : the ratio of debt to total assets. 
constant : constant term. 
 
  The estimation results show that the deviation of investment is small when the ratio of shareholding 
by government or individual is high. On the other hand the deviation of investment is high when the 
ratio of shareholding by bank or foreign institution is high. In addition when debt-asset ratio is high, 
the deviation of investment is also high. These results are coincident with table 2. 
  From the results of table 2 and table 3 we can realize that hypothesis 1 and 3 are supported. On the 
other hand, hypothesis 2 is not supported. It is conjectured that bank do not work to reduce a deviate 
of investment. As the same way debt of firms increase the deviation of investment.    
 
4. Conclusion 
 We analyze the determinants of deviation of investment from optimal condition. Model analysis 
conjectures that governance structure or financial institution of firms affects the deviation under the 
separate of ownership and management. 
 In empirical test, we estimate the investment function in which Tobin’ q and cash flow ratio is 
employed as explanatory variables. The deviation of investment can be estimated using the 
investment function. To use estimation, the following results can be induced. 
  The deviation of investment becomes small when the ownership is highly concentrated. Separate of 
ownership and management may bring the instability of investment because asymmetric of 
information becomes weak. 
 The same results can induced when main shareholder, especially the largest shareholder, is 
individual or government. On the contrary the deviation become larger when main shareholder is 
bank or foreign institution. 
 These results conclude that ownership structure affects investment behavior of firms. It is not 
observed that bank does not reduce the deviation of investment. It may mean that monitoring system 
does not well function to stable investment. As the same way the governance effect of debt 
management is not observed in empirical analysis. Reference 
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Appendix 1.   
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It is equivalent to the informative condition,  ) | ( ) ( ) , | ( x s g t K t x s f = . It means that the signal   
receiving by manager does not depend on his or her talent  , that is information structure is 
uninformative. Truthtelling equilibrium can not achieve except uninformative condition.   
s
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